Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00415 01 OF 04 072025Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05
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P R 071911Z JUL 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3058
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0415

FROM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 6 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 176TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON JULY 6, BELGIAN REP (SMOLDEREN) AND BULGARIAN REP (DICHEV) DELIVERED THE ONLY FORMAL STATEMENTS. THE BELGIAN STATEMENT IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE GDR STATEMENT AT THE JUNE 22 PLENARY MEETING, THE BULGARIAN STATEMENT DEPARTED FROM COMMON PRACTICE IN THAT IT WAS GIVEN ON A WEEK WHEN NORMALLY THE WEST WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE ONLY SPEAKER AND, AS IT ADDED NOTHING NEW OF SUBSTANCE, WAS LIKELY INTENDED SIMPLY AS A DEVICE TO KEEP THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT FOCUSSED ON THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE PRESENTATION DID CONTAIN
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00415 01 OF 04 072025Z

SOME DIFFERENCES IN DETAIL IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE DESCRIBED, BUT THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THESE DIFFERENCES PROBABLY REFLECT THE VAGARIES OF BULGARIAN DRAFTING RATHER THAN ALTERATIONS IN THE NEW EASTERN POSITION AS PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH. THE STATEMENT EMPHASIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUNE 8 MOVE AS A COMPROMISE

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

WHICH MET MORE THAN HALFWAY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF
THE WESTERN POSITION AND NOTED THAT WESTERN STATES
HAD RECOGNIZED ITS IMPORTANCE. THE STATEMENT ALSO
INCLUDED A RENEWED APPEAL FOR THE EASTERN INTERIM FREEZE
PROPOSAL, AN ACCUSATION THAT NATO WAS SEEKING TO
INCREASE AND INTENSIFY THE ARMS RACE AND A DENIAL OF
ANY WARSAW PACT FORCE INCREASES IN THE REDUCTION AREA
IN RECENT YEARS. THE FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL
DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF THE FULL TEXT OF DICHEV'S
STATEMENT WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. A MONTH HAS ALREADY PASSED SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA FULLY SUPPORTS THESE IMPORTANT ENTERPRISING
STEPS, AIMED AT MOVING OUR DISCUSSIONS OFF DEAD CENTRE AND AT
REACHING THE FIRST CONCRETE RESULTS. WE PROCEED IN THIS FROM
TWO BASIC STARTING POINTS, THAT IS:
- THAT THE FUTURE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF EITHER OF THE SIDES AND
- THAT THEY SHOULD ALLOW FOR MOVEMENT IN THE FUTURE TOWARDS THE
DISCUSSION OF OTHER CONCRETE QUESTIONS OF MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE.

2. THESE ARE THE PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATIONS BY WHICH WE ARE
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00415 01 OF 04 072025Z

GUIDED IN THE EVALUATION OF ANY PROPOSAL SUBMITTED FOR DISCUSSION
AROUND THIS TABLE.

3. THE PROPOSALS OF THE GDR, PPR, USSR, AND CSSR OF THE
8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IRRESPECTIVE OF
THEIR STATUS, MOREOVER, NOT ONLY OF THESE STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND
THEY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION, IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL, VERY
IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THIS CAN BE FULLY
ASSERTED ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE
FOR THE FOLLOWING:

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0415

4. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE CARRYING OUT OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES IN A DEFINITE TIME PERIOD AGREED BY THE SIDES AND IN SUCH A VOLUME AS WOULD BE PROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH INDIVIDUAL STATE, AND WHICH WILL EARLIER BE KNOWN TO ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE AGREEMENT;

5. IN THE SECOND PLACE, A METHOD OF REDUCING FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL FOR ALL STATES, WHICH WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH STATE IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS.

6. IN THE THIRD PLACE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE FIRST PHASE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THERE WOULD BE REDUCED THE GROUND FORCES OF THE USSR, FORMING ABOUT HALF OF ALL OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION, WHILE VERY LARGE CONTINGENTS OF THE GROUND FORCES OF NATO IN THIS ZONE WOULD STILL REMAIN OUTSIDE
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THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST REDUCTIONS. ONE MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EXCEPTIONALLY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROVISION.

7. IN THE FOURTH PLACE, THE CARRYING OUT OF SUCH A SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN THE FIRST STAGE WHICH, WHILE NOT UPSETTING THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY POWER OF BOTH GROUPINGS ESTABLISHED IN THE ZONE, WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY APPROXIMATE EQUALITY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE FURTHER INCREASE OF THIS POWER WOULD BE CONSTRAINED THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF A LIMITATION ON THE FORMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OF THE USA, AND ON ONE

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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OF THE BASIC FORMS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS, THAT IS TANKS, WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED.

8. IN THE FIFTH PLACE, THE WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

RESPECTIVELY OF 900,000 MILITARY SERVICEMEN FROM EACH SIDE, INCLUDING 700,000 FOR THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE NUMERICAL EQUALITY OF THE FORCES OF THE SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED AND THEN CONSOLIDATED IN SUCH A WAY AS OUR WESTERN PARTNERS RECOMMEND.

9. FINALLY, VERY IMPORTANT, IS THE FACT THAT IN THE PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR, THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONCERNING THE SECURTY OF THE COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL STATUS, WHICH GUARANTEES THE INTERESTS OF THESE STATES REMAIN VALID.

10. IT IS FULLY JUSTIFIABLE TO ASSERT THAT THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS INTRODUCED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON 8 JUNE COULD BE A GOOD BEGINNING FOR THE MATERIALISATION OF THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, IN WHICH ALL STATES
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REPRESENTED AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS MUST OBJECTIVELY BE INTERESTED
:
BOTH THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THOSE POSSESSING SPECIAL STATUS.
THE SUCCESS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR ALL EUROPEAN, AND NOT JUST EUROPEAN, PEOPLES.

11. ON THE BACKGROUND OF EVERYTHING SAID ABOVE, ONE CANNOT BUT OBSERVE THAT THE MODIFICATION IN THE WESTERN POSITION OF 19 APRIL THIS YEAR, ALTHOUGH IT GOES IN SOME ELEMENTS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, STILL DOES NOT ACCORD WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CARRYING OUT FUTURE REDUCTIONS, THAT IS, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY STATE, AND WOULD NOT GIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYONE. AS HAS ALREADY BEEN SHOWN HERE IN A DETAILED AND WELL ARGUED WAY BY MY COLLEAGUES FROM THE USSR, CSSR, GDR, AND PPR AROUND THIS TABLE, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL OF THIS YEAR TOUCHED ON, FOR

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00415 03 OF 04 072043Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0415

EXAMPLE, BUT CLEARLY DID NOT SOLVE THE QUESTION OF THE OBLIGATIONS
OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA CONCERNING THE VOLUMES
OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS TO BE REDUCED BY THEM. THE CHANGES IN
THIS CONNECTION, WHICH WERE INTRODUCED BY THE PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL,
IN THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION SHOW THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CON-
TINUE NEVERTHELESS TO PURSUE THE GOAL OF GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY
ADVANTAGES. I WOULD LIKE TO EXAMINE THIS QUESTION IN GREATER DETAIL.

COMRADE CHANIRMAN,

12, MOVING TOWARDS THE DESIRES OF THE WEST AND DESIRING TO CREATE
THE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS,
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGO-
TIATIONS EXPRESSED IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE THEIR AGREEMENT
TO SET DOWN IN A FIRST
STAGE AGREEMENT AN ESTABLISHMENT OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS IN THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW
PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE - 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,00 GROUND
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00415 03 OF 04 072043Z

FORCES RESPECTIVELY - AS THE FINAL AIM OF THE REDUCTION. THUS,
AT THE PRESENT TIME, IF ONE IS SPEAKING OBJECTIVELY, THERE EXISTS
A COINCIDENCE OF THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE SIDES ON ONE OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS CONCERNING THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE REU-
CTION OF FORCES. HOWEVER, THE FULLY NATURAL QUESTION ARISES BY
WHAT PATH SHOULD ONE REACH THIS OUTCOME.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

13. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR, AS THEY CONCERN THE DEFINITION IN A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND BY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USSR IN THE SECOND PHASE, REPRESENT A CERTAIN STEP FORWARD IN COMPARISON WITH THE EARLIER WESTERN POSITION. HOWEVER, THIS SAID, WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS DO NOT ENVISAGE CONCRETE AND EQUIVALENT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT.(

14. ACCORDING TO THE RENEWED WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE SOVIET UNION MUST, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE UPON ITSELF PRECISE INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS TO WITHDRAW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE A COMPLETELY DEFINITE QUANTITY OF MILITARY SERVICEMEN FORMED IN MAJOR MILITARY FORMATIONS AND ALSO A CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

15. IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO THIS, THE PROPOSALS OF THE NATO PARTICIPANTS OF 19 APRIL CONTAIN NOT PRECISE BUT VAGUE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, COMMITMENTS WHICH, LIKE THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION, ARE OF A COLLECTIVE CHARACTER. THIS HAS BEEN EMPHASISED IN THE CLARIFICATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE SAID THAT THE SHARE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA IN THE REDUCTIONS CANNOT BECOME A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
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16. FROM THIS POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IT FOLLOWS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST REDUCE ITS FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECISELY ELABORATED CONDITIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHILE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA WOULD DO SO IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONDITIONS WHICH THEY WOULD DETERMINE THEMSELVES IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER NATO PARTICIPANTS. FRANKLY SPEAKING, THIS PROVISION IS CONFIRMED ALSO BY THE FACT THAT, ON 19 APRIL, THE WESTERN STATES FORESAW EVEN THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPING FROM THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTION IN WHICH THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED.

17. IT IS FULLY JUSTIFIED FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS - AND THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION FULLY SHARES THEIR POINT OF VIEW - TO OBJECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TYPES OF REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR THE VARIOUS STATES. THIS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED EITHER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LOGIC OR FROM THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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18. SOVEREIGN STATES ARE TAKING PART IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS
AND EACH OF THEM MUST MAKE ITS OWN DEFINITE INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION
TO REDUCTIONS. IN ADDITION, WHEN THEY REDUCE THEIR OWN FORCES,
EACH OF THEM HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE A PRECISE CONCEPTION OF WHAT
REDUCTIONS OF FORCES THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL
CARRY OUT. "COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS", WHICH THE WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA ARE SEEKING, CAN UNDERMINE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VERY PROCESS OF REDUCTION BECAUSE DURING
THEIR REALISATION ONE GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS, HIDING BEHIND
THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF COMMITMENTS, CAN FIND ROUNDABOUT
WAYS OF ALLOWING ONE OR ANOTHER STATE TO DECREASE THE MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS REDUCTIONS AND IN THIS WAY TO GAIN FOR
ITSELF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

19. IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE INITIATIVE
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00415 03 OF 04 072043Z

OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF 8 JUNE CONTAINS PROVISIONS ACCORDING
TO WHICH ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00415 04 OF 04 072359Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0415

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

WILL TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
AND THAT MOREOVER, EACH OF THEM WILL, ALONG WITH THE OTHER
COUNTRIES, MAKE ITS OWN INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. THIS HAS FOUND ITS REFLECTION IN
THE FACT THAT, ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES, NOT ONLY THE USSR AND THE USA BUT ALSO THE OTHER
STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING HAVE TO UNDERTAKE PRECISE
COMMITMENTS THAT THEY WILL REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE
SECOND STAGE AND THAT THE CONCRETE VOLUME OF FORCES WHICH EACH
OF THEM MUST REDUCE WILL BE DEFINED. IT IS FULLY JUSTIFIED ALSO
FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO DEMAND THAT THE REMAINING
STATES, BESIDES THE USSR AND THE USA, SHOULD REDUCE NOT ONLY
THE PERSONNEL OF THEIR FORCES BUT ALSO THE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS
AGREED IN THE SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRINCIPLE OF
MUTUALITY, WHICH FOUND ITS CONSISTENT REFLECTION IN THE PROPOSALS
OF 8 JUNE, ASSUMES ALSO THAT THE METHOD OF REDUCTION OF FORCES
SHOULD BE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME FOR ALL STATES DIRECTLY
PARTICIPATING. THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE METHOD OF REDUCTION PROPOSED
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00415 04 OF 04 072359Z

BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PERMITS ONE TO DEFINE FOR EACH STATE
THE VOLUME OF COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO ITS
MILITARY POWER.

20. THUS IF ONE COMPARES THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL AND
THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF 8 JUNE THEN THIS
COMPARISON CINVINCINGLY SPEAKS IN FAVOUR OF THE LATTER.
GUARANTEEING AN EFFECTIVE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN
CENTRAL EUROPE, THEY FULLY CORRESPOND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL SIDES.

21. THE PRESENT 15TH ROUND OF THE VIENNA DIALOGUE HAS
COINCIDED WITH THE TIME OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN ON DISARMAMENT. FOR
THE FIRST TIME THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS DEDICATED ONE OF ITS
SESSIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT AND THE VERY FACT OF
THIS SESSION HAVING BEEN CALLED PROVES THAT THE LIMITATION AND
CURBING OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REAL DISARMAMENT
IS ONE OF THE DEEPEST ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE
WORLD. ONE OF THE FIRST DECISIONS IN THE SPHERE OF REAL
DISARMAMENT IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY DETENTE COULD BE IN OUR
OPINION TAKEN AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AS THE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, CHAIRMAN OF THE
PRAESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, L.I. BREZHNEV
RECENTLY INDICATEDN "IT IS PRECISELY IN EUROPE WHERE IT CAN BE
SHOWN IN PRACTICE THAT ONE MUST CORXIST, COOPERATE AND WORK
TOGETHER".

22. INSTEAD OF INCREASING AND INTENSIFYING THE ARMS RACE IN
THE WAY THAT THE NATO MEMBER STATES HAVE RECENTLY AGAIN TRIED

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

TO DO DURING THE MAIN SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
IN WASHINGTON WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF LIMITING THIS RACE IN CENTRAL
EUROPE AS IN OTHER PARTS OF THIS OLD CONTINENT AND INDEED NOT
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ONLY THERE. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, I SHOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN
WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS
OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN PARTICULAR TO THE NECESSITY OF
UNDERTAKING WITHOUT DELAY REAL MEASURES IN THIS DIRECTION AND
OF AGREEING ON A NON-INCREASE OF THE FORCES OF STATES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION WOULD HAVE A REAL POLITICAL, JURIDICAL,
MILITARY AND EVEN ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE. THE LAST YEARS HAVE
SHOWN THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE IN FACT ESTABLISHED IN
THE ZONE OF FUTURE REDUCTIONS, IN A UNILATERAL WAY, A SIMILAR
MORATORIUM ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES.
ALSO, THEY DO NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THEM IN THE FUTURE, NEITHER
BY ONE SOLDIER NOR BY ONE TANK.

23. THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION REALISES THAT IN THEIR MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE, THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF 8 JUNE
DO NOT GO AS FAR AS THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION BUT THIS IS THE RESULT
OF THE FACT THAT OUR WESTERN PARTNERS ARE STILL NOT PREPARED
FOR MORE IMPORTANT MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY DETENTE
IN EUROPE. WE ARE PREPARED, UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, TO BEGIN
WITH STEPS OF LESS SIGNIFICANCE, WHICH WOULD HELP TO GO ALONG
THE ROAD LEADING TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.
MANKIND ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY HAS NO OTHER REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE. BY THE INTRODUCTION ON 8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR OF NEW
MAJOR PROPOSALS, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHICH HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED
BY NEARLY ALL WESTERN STATES, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE GONE
MORE THAN HALF WAY.

24. THE QUESTION NOW STANDS BEFORE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT DEAN

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20 Mar 2014
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